Mackenzie Bill & Charge of The Indian Brigade

Among the controversial actions that brought Lord Curzon into confrontation with the early Indian nationalists, historians have given most emphasis to the reform of the Indian Universities and the partition of Bengal; the then Calcutta municipal reform of 1999 receives only passing mention. Yet this episode is of equal interest in understanding the dynamics of the Curzon regime.

It is important if only because it provided the occasion for Curzon's first decisive intervention in local affairs, for although he did not initiate the legislation he substantially influenced decisions that might have been made routinely by the Government of Bengal.

This drew him into the vortex of city’s politics and shaped his perception of the capital's affairs for the remainder of his term of office. For Bengali nationalists the agitation against the municipal reform became the most prolonged and far reaching campaign they had so far organised.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the managing body of the city had become practically a ‘by-word’ for controversy in India. Since the 1860’s, the major conflicts in municipal politics had been generated by the system of ratepayer representation on the municipal corporation, the distribution of power within it and the alleged consequences for municipal progress.

Under the 1888 amendment to the Municipal Act of 1876 that had initiated an elective system, two-thirds of the municipal commissioners were elected by qualified ratepayers in the city’s 25 wards: two for each ward.

Special constituencies elected further ten commissioners: four each by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and the Calcutta Trades Association and two by the Port Commission (often referred to as the “commercial seats”). The lieutenant governor of Bengal nominated the final 15 members of the 75 commissioners.

The majority of enfranchised ratepayers were Hindus (73 per cent of the 13,890 voters in 1898). But their dominance of the electorate was somewhat lessened by the system of plural voting and the distribution of seats in relation to the Ward population. In the election of 1897 Hindus secured 36 of the 50 Ward seats. The British residents, comprising three per cent of the city’s population, constituted 15.4 per cent of the electorate and commanded 19.4 per cent of the voting power. The block of “Commercial Seats” further enhanced their representation on the Corporation. The Muslims benefitted least from these arrangements. With 28 per cent of the population and 10.5 per cent of the electorate, they held only nine per cent of the voting power.

The men most successful in municipal elections and most prominent in the Corporation were largely high-caste Hindu professional men, many of them lawyers, who were almost invariably affiliated with the leading political clubs of Calcutta, the Indian Association and the British Indian Association, and supporters of the Indian National Congress. A core of elected commissioners had served on the Corporation and the general committee since the introduction of the elective system. 

 

Among these were Surendranath Banerjea, Narendra Nath Sen and NN Ghose all of whom had become prominent as public figures from the initial basis of municipal work. However, it is important to note that these men had their differences of opinion on municipal matters and the Hindu commissioners as a whole (including nominees) were a diverse collection of professional men, businessmen and property holders.

The European commissioners, too, were a mixed lot — including some ICS officers, doctors, lawyers and tradesmen — but they shared a record of short periods of municipal service, low attendance at meetings and reluctance to serve on municipal committees. By the 1880s the Muslims were beginning to be concerned about their representation in municipal government, but at best they could only command a dozen seats (including nominated ones).   In general they supported the “government line” in municipal matters.

Critics of the elective system, drawn from both the unofficial European community and the ICS, maintained that it had allowed Bengali Hindus to “capture” municipal government, overpowering the British commercial interests. The “Hindu clique” was held responsible for the slow progress of municipal projects. Sir Alexander Mackenzie, lieutenant governor of Bengal, voiced an extreme expression of those charges in 1897:

“For the past ten years it (the Calcutta Corporation) has been dominated by Bengali Hindus. It embodies their idea of what a Bengali Parliament should be, and it gives the fullest expression to the demoralising doctrine that practical considerations are to be subordinated to the supposed educational influences of Local Self-Government.”

For their part, the active Hindu commissioners argued that the British citizens of Calcutta had largely boycotted the elective system while they (the Hindus) conscientiously carried the burden of routine municipal management, against a background of unwarranted carping from the provincial government. The city’s lack of progress in municipal improvement; they claimed, was due to British apathy, financial constraints and outright executive inefficiency.

Tensions were brought to a head by the plague scare of 1896. When the pestilence was reported in Bombay, there was a panic reaction in Calcutta and the interest groups of British Indian commerce called for the suspension of the Corporation on the grounds that the commissioners were unfit to deal with a sanitary crisis.

Sir Alexander Mackenzie took the opportunity to act. Charging the Bengali Hindu commissioners with inefficiency, over-talkativeness, interference in executive matters and municipal corruption, the lieutenant governor, largely guided by HH Risley, then secretary to the Government of Bengal brought forward legislation to amend the Calcutta Municipal Act.

What Risley proposed instead was a change in the distribution of power within the Corporation through an alteration of the relations among its components: the executive, the general committee and the body of commissioners. The body of commissioners was to be stripped of its former supremacy in the municipal system, full executive power was to be vested in the municipal chairman and the composition of the general committee was to be altered so that the elected ward commissioners would be decisively out-numbered. The Bengal Government saw this last provision as crucial — it would ensure that supporters of the government would have a dominant voice on the Corporation's policy-making committee.

In attempting to overcome the objections of the Government of India to the legislation, Mackenzie underlined his motives: the Government had to act to “shift the power to the disadvantage of the Hindu oligarchy”, and gain influence over even the minor decisions of the municipal administration.

Between September and December 1897, the viceroy Lord Elgin, attempted to persuade Bengal to drop or to moderate the legislation. Both he, and the new secretary of State, Lord George Hamilton, felt Mackenzie had blundered seriously in his charges against the elected Hindu commissioners, which the lieutenant governor had been unable to substantiate.

HH Risley introduced the Calcutta Municipal Bill in the Bengal Legislative Council in March 1898. Bengali politicians were primed to defend what was considered the most “liberal” municipal constitution of the presidency capitals.

A handful of men — mobilised by Surendranath Banerjea and NN Sen — organised the initial agitation. As their movement grew they became popularly known as “the opposition” being referred to privately by members of the ICS as the ‘Baboo Party’. While they had little initial success in gaining the support of representatives of the European and Muslim communities, by February 1899, they had argued their case cogently enough and had demonstrated sufficient diversity of support in Calcutta to give Lord George Hamilton pause.

In fact, in a historic move on September 1, 1899 as protest against the Bill 28 commissioners led by Surendranath Banerjea resigned from their posts. This drew the final straw as Hamilton decided that the “Mackenzie Bill” must be scrapped and he saw the change over of viceroys as an opportunity to recommend face-saving changes in the legislation.